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ABSTRACT
The wide acceptance of Internet of Things (IoT) for both house-
hold and industrial applications is accompanied by several security
concerns. A major security concern is their probable abuse by adver-
saries towards their malicious intent. Understanding and analyzing
IoT malicious behaviors is crucial, especially with their rapid growth
and adoption in wide-range of applications. Among the variety of
employed techniques, static and dynamic analyses are the most
common approaches to detect and classify malware. Given the lim-
ited scalability of dynamic analysis, static analysis, such as the use
of Control Flow Graph (CFG)-based features, is widely used by
machine learning algorithms for malware analysis and detection.
However, recent studies have shown that machine learning-based
approaches are susceptible to adversarial attacks by adding junk
codes to the binaries, for example, with an intention to fool those
machine learning or deep learning-based detection systems. Realiz-
ing the importance of addressing this challenge, this study proposes
a malware detection system that is robust to adversarial attacks.
To do so, examine the performance of the state-of-the-art methods
against adversarial IoT software crafted using the graph embedding
and augmentation techniques. In particular, we study the robustness
of such methods against two black-box adversarial methods, GEA
and SGEA, to generate Adversarial Examples (AEs) with reduced
overhead, and keeping their practicality intact. Our comprehensive
experimentation with GEA-based AEs show the relation between
misclassification and the graph size of the injected sample. Upon
optimization and with small perturbation, by use of SGEA, all the
IoT malware samples are misclassified as benign. This highlights
the vulnerability of current detection systems under adversarial set-
tings. With the landscape of possible adversarial attacks, we then
propose DL-FHMC, a fine-grained hierarchical learning approach
for malware detection and classification, that is robust to AEs with a
capability to detect 88.52% of the malicious AEs.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has shown its fast growth in the last
decade. The communication media of IoT devices is not limited only
in the form of home networking, but also the cellular, which signifi-
cantly accelerated their connectivity and accessibility. According to
Ericsson [27], 3.5 billion IoT devices are expected to communicate
using cellular in 2023. On the one side, taking advantage from the
a large number of interconnected devices, many applications can
be adopted on a large scale. Moreover, due to the high-speed and
low-latency connection of these devices, time critical applications
will become feasible in the real world. On the down side, however,
the high accessibility also provides a convenience to adversaries.
Due to the constrained resource of IoT devices, the protection func-
tion is usually inefficient. Moreover, due to the large population,
low physical accessibility, and the unrestricted use of policies in
many scenarios, IoT devices can be easily compromised and abused
by adversaries to launch a variety of attacks, such as Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks launched by Mirai botnet [12].
Such adversarial scenarios are expected to grow for many years to
come, posing a critical security threats for the IoT ecosystem.
There has been a large body of research work on the problem
of malware analysis using both static and dynamic approaches [28,
31, 37], and a few attempts on analyzing IoT malware in particular.
Recently, machine learning algorithms, specifically deep learning
techniques, are actively utilized in security and privacy applica-
tions [1–3, 20, 32], particularly, for detecting and classifying mali-
cious software from benign ones. However, it should be noted that
the research work on IoT malware analysis has been very limited
not only in the size of the analyzed samples, but also the utilized
approaches [14, 21, 42, 44]. Among the static analysis-based ap-
proaches, one of the prominent approach is to use an abstract graph
structures for IoT malware analysis and detection, such as the control
flow graph (CFG) [8, 10]. Previously, it has been shown that the
software graph-based analysis can be incorporated with machine
learning methods to introduce more powerful analysis tools [13, 56].
For the IoT malware detection, CFGs allow defenders to extract
plentiful feature representations that can be used to distinguish those
malware from benign, owing to their various properties, such as the
degree distribution, centrality measures, radius, etc.. [10]. Those
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properties can be represented as a feature vector that can be used to
enable machine learning algorithms to accurately detect and clas-
sify IoT malware samples. Proposed by Alasmary et al., one such
application is exploring IoT malware using both graph analysis and
machine/deep learning [10]. Their model not only can learn the rep-
resentative characteristics of the graph, but also can be utilized to
build an automatic detection system for predicting the label of the
unseen software.
Unfortunately, machine learning-based IoT malware detection
methods are prone to adversarial manipulation [40]. The rise of ad-
versarial machine learning has highlighted the fragile nature of those
algorithms to perturbation and data poisoning attacks that lead to
misclassification. For example, an adversary can introduce a small
modification to the input sample to make the classifier misidentify
the malware as a benign (i.e., the adversary introduce an adversarial
example). Such modification are usually crafted using small pertur-
bation to make the AE undetectable and very difficult to distinguish
for the original sample.
To date, there has been a large body of work exploring the genera-
tion of AEs in general image-based classification problems [30, 38]
as well as in the context of malware classification [5, 29, 41]. Also,
there is an active trend in the research area towards investigating
adversarial machine learning to overcome these threat. However,
there is very limited research that aims to understand the impact of
adversarial learning on deep learning-based IoT malware detection
system and practical implications, especially for those approaches
that utilize CFG features. We stress the importance of addressing the
threat posed by the machine learning vulnerability to AEs, particu-
larly in security-sensitive applications. We undertake this challenge
by 1 showing the high potential of successful detection/classifi-
cation of IoT malware using deep learning methods; 2 assessing
the robustness of such methods to AEs generated by different state-
of-the-art CFG-based AEs generation techniques; 3 introducing a
fine-grained hierarchical approach to tackle adversarial attacks by
leveraging patterns extracted from the basic and elementary structure
of the tested software.
To this end, we introduce DL-SSMC, Deep Learning-based Single
Shot Malware Classification approach, for accurate IoT malware
detection and classification. Then, we examine the approach against
AEs generated by GEA [5] and SGEA [4]. The GEA and SGEA
are graph-based AEs generation approaches that are recently pro-
posed to launch targeted and untargeted misclassification attacks.To
cope with adversarial settings and to minimize their effects, we pro-
pose DL-FHMC, Fine-grained Hierarchical Learning for Malware
Classification, for detecting and classifying malware samples by
operating on a fine-grained level of structures and patterns extracted
from the tested software sample. Our experiments show the effective-
ness of the proposed approach in detecting malware samples as well
as high-degree of robustness against variety of adversarial attacks.
Summary of contributions. Our contributions are as follows: First,
we introduce DL-SSMC for IoT malware detection and classification.
Second, we examine the robustness of the CFG-based deep learning
IoT malware detection system using two different approaches, in-
cluding GEA and SGEA. The GEA approach generates adversarial
IoT software, through embedding representative target sample to
the original software, while maintaining the practicality and func-
tionality of the targeted sample. SGEA is an optimization of GEA
to generate AEs with reduced injection size. Through comprehen-
sive experiments, we show the effectiveness of GEA and SGEA in
producing successful AEs that can fool the machine learning-based
malware detection system. The results show that GEA and SGEA
approaches achieve a malware-to-benign misclassification rate of up
to 100%. To tackle such vulnerability, we propose DL-FHMC that
gains insights by investigating the malicious subgraphs (patterns)
within the IoT malware families. Using a fine-grained hierarchical
learning approach, DL-FHMC utilizes subgraph mining and pattern
recognition to detect suspicious and malicious behaviors within the
tested samples, mitigating the effects of AEs and detecting 88.52%
of malicious AEs.
Organization. This work is organized as follows: In §2, a brief
background is provided. The presented practical approach for gen-
erating practical adversarial IoT software is described in §3. In §4,
we evaluate the proposed adversarial methods on traditional deep
learning techniques. Then, we propose a fine-grained hierarchical
learning technique for suspicious behavior detection in §5. In §6, we
discuss the proposed adversarial methods and suspicious behavior
detection approach. Related work has been discussed in §7. Finally,
we conclude our work in §8.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We incorporate adversarial learning techniques into CFG-based deep
learning IoT malware detection systems in an attempt to understand
the robustness of such models against adversarial learning attacks as
a result of AEs. We provide a required preliminary knowledge for
understanding those techniques and approaches required for malware
analysis to extract graph structures and to automate their labeling
using machine learning. In particular, we provide general knowledge
about the malware analysis approaches in §2.1. The CFG-based
analysis for IoT malware detection is described in §2.2. Finally, we
describe background knowledge about the concept of adversarial
machine learning and its effects on machine learning models in §2.3.
2.1 Malware Analysis
Malware analysis is widely used to understand the functionality
and behavior of malware. It helps us to understand the capabilities
and the intent of the malware and malware authors. The results of
the analyses are often used to build detectors and design defenses
to protect against future malware campaigns. There are two ap-
proaches utilized for analyzing malicious software: (i) static and (ii)
dynamic analyses. Static analysis approaches analyze malware bina-
ries without the need for execution. Given the malicious nature of
the malware, static analysis is utilized as a precursor to the dynamic
analysis. The malware binary can then be executed in a sandboxed
environment with a much-reduced focus to observe the patterns, like
the behavioral artifacts in which is called the dynamic analysis.
Static Analysis. Static analysis approaches employ various tech-
niques to extract indicators to determine whether the software is
malicious or benign [57]. The various analysis points, such as in-
structions, basic blocks, functions etc. hint at the possible execution
pattern of the software. For example, the traces of using user name
and password list, along with shell-based login attempts, implies
possible usage of dictionary attack being launched by the software.
These inferential results are drawn from static analysis to enable
the analysts to emphasize and predict specific patterns. Additionally,
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traces can also be used by analysts to address issues during dynamic
analysis, e.g., virtual machine obfuscation, ptrace obfuscation etc..
Traces and components of software are often extracted using a re-
verse engineering process of the software binaries that allow the
understanding of its composition, architecture, and design. Ana-
lysts perform reverse engineering of software binaries using several
available off-the-shelf tools. The reverse engineering process also
generates artifacts to be subject of analysis including high-level rep-
resentation of the binaries such as the CFGs and Data Flow Graphs
(DFGs). The CFG of a program is the graphical representation of
the flow of control during the execution of that program. While
the DFG represents the system events to understand the possible
execution of the system behaviors. It explains the flow of the data
that passes from one node to another. Although static analysis is
quite powerful and popular, it sometimes falls short of achieving
its end goals of providing in-depth insights to the software due
to multiple evasion techniques. For example, malware developers
use evasion techniques to the analysis of their produced malware.
The evasion techniques include packing (UPX [25]), obfuscation
(function-, string- obfuscation), etc..
Dynamic Analysis. Unlike static analysis, dynamic analysis exe-
cutes the application in a simulated and monitored environment to
observe its behavior and understand its functionality [49]. This ap-
proach aims to capture different behavioral patterns of software. For
example, dynamic analysis helps unraveling the program’s network
patterns, such as communication with the Command and Control
(C&C) server. Since the malicious nature of software can affect the
status of the machine it is executed on, the following observations are
made: 1) comparing the system state before and after the execution
of the application, or 2) monitoring the application’s actions during
the execution. Similar to the static analysis, dynamic analysis can
be evaded by software developers by adopting means that prevent
their software from getting dynamically-analyzed. For example, mal-
ware developers often employ conditions that crashes the software
once encountering virtual machines, debugging tools or network
monitoring tools.
2.2 Graph Analysis
Graph Analysis. The CFG is a graph representation of the program
which shows all paths that can be reached during the execution as in
Figure 1. In a CFG, the set of nodes means the basic blocks where
each block is a straight-line instruction without any jump or jump
target, while the set of directed edges corresponds to the jump which
traverses from the block to the other block at the branch (if), loop
(while, for), and the end of the function (return). Once the first in-
struction of the basic block is executed, the rest of the instructions in
the same block are necessarily executed unless terminated by exter-
nal interference. In general, CFG is used for the structural analysis of
the program. For example, from the perspective of optimization, the
CFG is used to analyze the reachability of each block. By construct-
ing the CFG and evaluating the reachability, the flaws of the program
(infinite loop or unreachable codes) can be found and addressed.
CFG-based Analysis. In graph theory, there are various concepts
that express the characteristics of a graph. Given G = (V ,E), for
example, the number of vertices (|V |) means the order of G, while
the number of edges (|E |) corresponds to the size of G. The density
of the graph can be defined as D = |E |/(|V | ∗ (|V | − 1)) for directed
simple graph, which means the ratio of the number of edges in
G to the maximal number of edges in the complete graph. The
centrality is measured for each node v ∈ V , which shows how
important a specific node is. In detail, there are several different kinds
of centrality, such as closeness centrality, betweenness centrality,
Eigenvector centrality, etc..
These indicators (and further concepts not described above) can be
considered the features of the graphG. Moreover, the combination of
those metrics can be a more deterministic characteristic of the graph.
Considering that a CFG is a kind of graph, it is true that each binary
has not only its unique graph representation but also the associated
values, such as the order, size, and density of CFG, and centrality
for each vertex in CFG. On the other hand, the graph-based analysis
can provide the possibility for identifying the malware. Because
it is highly likely that the binaries in the same “family” share the
structural similarity (even if there is a little difference), the CFG-
based features can be combined with the state-of-the-art machine
learning technique to determine whether a given binary is malicious.
2.3 Threat Model
The rapid reliance on machine learning methods in various applica-
tions have raised several security and privacy concerns, especially in
security-sensitive applications. It has become crucial to understand
and assess the robustness of machine learning techniques to several
adversarial settings. These adversarial settings includes AEs, where
an adversary intends to fool or misguide the classification model
with malicious inputs that are generated by applying minimal per-
turbation to the original sample [41]. These inputs misclassify the
samples of the model from benign to malware and vice versa and
even misclassify the malware classes to another class. Such adversar-
ial attacks can be launched under different adversarial capabilities
that allow for either black-box and white-box attack. In a white-box
attack, the adversary has full knowledge of the inner networking
paradigm of the model, while in a black-box attack, the adversary
has only access to the model via an oracle and observe only the
output of the model.
The literature on AEs and their effects shows numerous studies
conducted on images, where the perturbation is applied to image
pixels [40, 41, 48]. Unlike image AEs, the generated AEs from the
IoT software must preserve the original sample’s functionality and
practicality in order to function properly. In this study, we generate
AEs from the IoT software based on code-level manipulation using
GEA [5] and SGEA [4]. Adversarial machine learning can be derived
from two perspectives: targeted and non-targeted attacks. Targeted
attacks. The focus of this attack is to generate AE x ′ that forces the
classifier f to misclassify into a specific target class t . For instance,
the adversary generates a set of malicious IoT software samples,
which are classified as benign. That is: x ′ : [f (x ′) = t]∧[∆ (x ,x ′) ≤
ϵ], where f (.) represents the classifierâA˘Z´s output, ∆ (x ,x ′) denotes
the difference between x and x ′, whereas ϵ is the distortion threshold.
Non-targeted attacks. The focus of non-targeted attack is to gen-
erate an AE that forces the classifier f to misclassify to any class
other than the original class f (x), where x is the original input. That
is: x ′ : [f (x ′) , f (x)] ∧ [∆ (x ,x ′) ≤ ϵ], where f (.) shows the
classifier’s output, ∆ (x ,x ′) represents the difference between x and
x ′, and ϵ is the distortion threshold.
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Table 1: Distribution of IoT samples across the classes. We split
the dataset into 80% training and 20% testing, with an overall
8,670 IoT samples (5,670 IoT malware and 3,000 benign).
Class # of Samples % of Samples# Train # Test # Total
Benign 2,400 600 3,000 34.60%
Malicious
Gafgyt 2,400 600 3,000 34.60%
Mirai 1,927 481 2,408 27.68%
Tsunami 210 52 262 3.02%
Overall 6,937 1,733 8,670 100%
Table 2: The distribution of extracted features. 23 algorithmic
features are extracted from the CFGs. These features are cate-
gorized into seven groups, including number of nodes and edges,
density, shortest path, and centralities. When possible, the mini-
mum, maximum, median, mean, and standard deviation values
are extracted, as in the shortest path group.
Feature category # of features
Betweenness centrality 5
Closeness centrality 5
Degree centrality 5
Shortest path 5
Density 1
# of Edges 1
# of Nodes 1
Total 23
3 MALWARE AND ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES
This work aims to investigate the robustness of current practices
of machine learning in analyzing IoT malware for detection and
classification, especially against sophisticated AEs. To generate AE,
an adversary applies a perturbation ϵ to the model’s input x to fool
the classifier by generating a new input feature space x ′ = x + ϵ .
Thus, the generated output f of the model f (x) , f (x ′), aiming
to misclassify the output of the targeted model. For a practical and
functional adversarial behavior with the ability of being hiding from
detection systems, the perturbation ϵ is minimized to be δ = ϵmin ,
where f (x) , f (x + δ ). For IoT malware detection system, the AE
process aims to generate AEs that preserve the functionality and
practicality of the original IoT software. Recent work [5] proposed a
Graph Embedding and Augmentation (GEA) approach that ensures
the practicality of the AEs by applying ϵ at the code-level of the IoT
samples. To reduce the perturbation overhead of GEA for efficient
adversarial settings, another approach for generating AEs, Sub-GEA
(SGEA) [4], was proposed. This section describes the dataset used
in this work and the two approaches for generating AEs, namely:
GEA and SGEA.
3.1 Dataset
For the purpose of this study, we gathered a dataset of IoT malware
samples. We collected binaries of two categories, IoT malicious and
benign samples. The malicious samples are collected from CyberI-
OCs [22] in the period of January 2018 to late February of 2019,
with a total of 5,670 samples that belong to three malware families.
Additionally, we assembled a dataset of 3,000 benign IoT samples
compiled from the source files on GitHub [23].
Ground Truth Class. The benign and malicious samples in our
dataset were validated using the VirusTotal [24]. We uploaded the
samples on VirusTotal and gathered the scan results corresponding
to each sample. We then used AVClass [43] to classify the malicious
samples into their families. We summarize the dataset in table 1.
Dataset Creation. Samples of the IoT benign category (3,000 sam-
ple) and IoT malware category (5,670 samples) were reverse-engineered
using Radare2 [26], a reverse engineering framework that provides
various analysis capabilities, for obtaining the samples’ correspond-
ing CFGs. Using the samples’ CFGs extracted by Radare2, we
extracted different graph-theoretic features to represent the software
sample for the machine learning algorithm. We extracted 23 different
algorithmic features categorized into seven groups. Table 2 shows
the feature category and the number of features in each category.
The five features extracted from each feature category represent
minimum, maximum, median, mean, and standard deviation values
for the observed parameters.
3.2 Graph Embedding and Augmentation (GEA)
Recent work [5] introduces GEA approach that generates realistic
AEs, where they maintain the functionality and practicality of the
original IoT sample and achieving a high misclassification rate. The
main goal was to combine an original CFG with a selected targeted
CFG. The authors show that such a combination leads to a high
misclassification rate. In the following, we briefly describe the GEA
approach using an example.
Practical Implementation. Assume xorд is an original sample and
xsel is a selected target sample, GEA aims to combine the original
sample (xorд) with a selected target sample (xsel ) while preserving
the functionality and practicality of the original sample (xorд). For
example, Listing 1 shows the original sample script (xorд), and
Listing 2 shows the selected target sample script (xsel ). The GEA
process combines the two scripts while ensuring that (xsel ) does
not affect the process and functionality of (xorд). The generated AE
in Listing 3 shows the script after the combination process. Note that
the condition is set to execute only the functionality related to (xorд)
and preventing the processes of (xsel ) from being executed. Prior
to generating the CFG for these algorithms, we compile the code
using the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) command. Afterward,
Radare2 [26] is used to extract the CFG from the binaries. Figure 1
and Figure 2 show the generated CFGs for both (xorд) and (xsel ),
respectively. As shown in Figure 3, the combined CFG consists of
the two scripts sharing the same entry and exit nodes. Therefore, the
GEA approach adds modifications to the CFG for generating the AE.
Given the nature of the extracted features, the applied changes on
the CFG is reflected upon the features, regardless of the effects on
the functionality and executability of the original sample. Following
the adopted approach in [5], we select six different-sized graphs
from benign and malicious samples as xsel . The selected graphs
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# i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
void main ( ) {
i n t a = 0 ;
do
{
a ++;
} whi le ( a < 1 0 ) ;
}
Listing 1: C script of an ex-
ample of original sample
# i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
void main ( ) {
i n t x = 0 ;
i n t s = 0 ;
i f ( x ! = 0 ) {
s ++;
}
}
Listing 2: C script of an ex-
ample of targeted sample
# i n c l u d e < s t d i o . h>
void main ( ) {
/ * s e t a c o n d i t i o n v a r i a b l e * /
i n t cond =1;
i f ( cond ==1){
/ * s c r i p t o f o r i g i n a l sample * /
/ * t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l be e x e c u t e d * /
i n t a = 0 ;
do{
a ++;
} whi le ( a < 1 0 ) ;
}
e l s e {
/ * s c r i p t o f t a r g e t sample * /
/ * t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l n o t be e x e c u t e d * /
i n t x = 0 ;
i n t s = 0 ;
i f ( x ! = 0 ) {
s ++;
}
}
}
Listing 3: C script of combining original and selected sam-
ples. Note that a condition variable is used to enable the de-
sired functionality. Additionally, the script of the original and
selected samples are preserved within the generated sample.
vary in size by minimum, median, or max graph size, where the size
is the number of nodes in the graph. To generate AEs, we selected
a graph and connected it with all samples from the opposite class
using shared entry and exit nodes.
3.3 Sub-GEA (SGEA)
While GEA combines an original CFG to a selected CFG of the
IoT samples to fool the classifier, SGEA approach aims to reduce
the injection size and achive the adversarial objectives with min-
imal perturbation. More specifically, it uses deep discriminative
subgraph patterns extracted from the CFGs of each class using a
correspondence-based quality criterion (CORK) algorithm, which
defines a submodular quality criterion that ensures a solution close
to the optimal solution [47]. This is done by using subgraphs that
# inc lude < s t d i o . h>
void main ( ) {
i n t GEAVar1 = 0 ; / / b l o c k 0
i f ( GEAVar1 == 1){ / / b l o c k 1
GEAVar1 += 1 ;
}
e l s e i f ( GEAVar1 == 2){ / / b l o c k 2
GEAVar1 += 2 ;
}
i n t GEAVar2 = 0 ; / / b l o c k 3
i f ( GEAVar2 == 0){ / / b l o c k 4
GEAVar2 += 1 ;
}
e l s e { / / b l o c k 5
GEAVar2 += 2 ;
}
i n t GEAVar3 = 0 ; / / b l o c k 6
}
Listing 4: C script of an example Gafgyt extracted subgraph.
Each block is represented as a node in the generated CFG. Ap-
pending this code to the source code of a sample will lead to
producing the subgraph shown in Figure 4.
appear more frequently in one class than others, to fool the ma-
chine learning model in predicting that class (e.g., when launching
a targeted attack). Let D denotes the CFGs of the training samples,
D = {Gi }ni=1 and class labels C = {ci }ni=1 where ci ∈ {+1,−1} is
the class label of graph Gi . Also let D+ and D− denote the set of
graphs in the corresponding classes. For a multi-class dataset, we
run the CORK algorithm once for each class where all the graph that
belong to the same class are included in D+ and the other graphs are
in D−. A graph Gi supports another graph S if S is a subgraph of Gi .
Let DS = {Gi |S ⊆ Gi ∀ Gi ∈ D} denote the supporting graphs of a
subgraph S . Moreover, let D+S and D
−
S , denote the supporting graphs
of the subgraph in the positive and negative graphs, respectively.
CORK defines a submodular quality criterion, q, for a subgraph
based on the set of supporting graphs (‘hits’) and non-supporting
graphs (‘misses’) in the two classes and is calculated as follows:
q(Gs ) = −(|D+∼S | ∗ |D+∼S | + |D+S | ∗ |D−S |). The best quality score is
achieved when a subgraph appears in all graphs of one class and
not once in the graphs of the other classes; the quality score is 0.
Pruning strategies, as used in the quality criterion of CORK, are
integrated into the gSpan algorithm [54] to directly mine discrimina-
tive subgraphs. Once the set of discriminative subgraphs are mined,
we employ gSpan, a graph-based substructure mining pattern for
mining frequent subgraphs of size five nodes or higher.
Practical Implementation. The original sample (xorд) is combined
with the selected discriminative subgraph (xsel ). For example, Fig-
ure 4 shows the discriminative subgraph extracted from the Gafgyt
class and listing 4 shows the equivalent C script to generate that
subgraph, which can then be combined with the original sample
(xorд) to generate an AE. Figure 5 shows the overview of patterns
extraction and the process of generating AEs in the SGEA approach.
While GEA modifies the CFG by connecting the selected graph with
5
;-- main:
/ (fcn) sym.main 24
| sym.main ();
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6 push rbp
| 0x004004d7 mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x004004e1 add dword [local_4h], 1
| 0x004004e5 cmp dword [local_4h], 9
| 0x004004e9 jle 0x4004e1
| 0x004004eb nop
| 0x004004ec pop rbp
\ 0x004004ed ret
Figure 1: The generated CFG for the original sample
and used for extracting graph-based features (graph
size, centralities, etc.) for graph/program classifica-
tion and malware detection.
;-- main:
/ (fcn) sym.main 35
| sym.main ();
| ; var int local_8h @ rbp-0x8
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6 push rbp
| 0x004004d7 mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da mov dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x004004e1 mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x004004e8 cmp dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x004004ec je 0x4004f6
| 0x004004f6 nop
| 0x004004f7 pop rbp
\ 0x004004f8 ret
| 0x004004ee mov dword [local_4h], 0xa
| 0x004004f5 nop
Figure 2: The CFG for the selected target sample generated
and used for extracting graph-based features (graph size, cen-
tralities, etc.) for graph/program classification and malware de-
tection.
/ (fcn) main 66
| main ();
| ; var int local_10h @ rbp-0x10
| ; va0r int local_ch @ rbp-0xc
| ; var int local_8h @ rbp-0x8
| ; var int local_4h @ rbp-0x4
| 0x004004d6 push rbp
| 0x004004d7 mov rbp, rsp
| 0x004004da mov dword [local_ch], 1
| 0x004004e1 cmp dword [local_ch], 1
| 0x004004e5 jne 0x4004fa
| 0x004004fa mov dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x00400501 mov dword [local_4h], 0
| 0x00400508 cmp dword [local_8h], 0
| 0x0040050c je 0x400515
| 0x004004e7 mov dword [local_10h], 0
| 0x00400515 nop
| 0x00400516 pop rbp
\ 0x00400517 ret
| 0x0040050e mov dword [local_4h], 0xa
| 0x004004ee add dword [local_10h], 1
| 0x004004f2 cmp dword [local_10h], 9
| 0x004004f6 jle 0x4004ee
| 0x004004f8 jmp 0x400515
Figure 3: The generated adversarial graph using GEA ap-
proach. Note that this graph is obtained logically by embedding
the graph in Fig. 2 into the graph in Fig. 1, although indirectly
done by injecting the code listings in Listings 1, 2, and 3.
the original sample, SGEA connects a carefully generated subgraph
with the original sample to generate AE, reducing the injected graph
size. To generate the subgraph, we extracted the discriminative sub-
graph patterns from each class, with a size of five nodes or higher.
Then, in order to reduce the graph size needed to be injected, we
connect the original sample with the subgraph with minimum size.
If the generated AE misclassifies, the process succeed, and the AE
will be returned; else, we select the next subgraph in ascending order
regarding the number of nodes in the subgraph. In case none of
the subgraphs cause misclassification, the original sample will be
returned as the process failed.
Constructing an AE. As shown in Figure 5, we extract a set of
subgraphs from the targeted class. Then, we combine the original
sample with the smallest extracted subgraph of the targeted class
1 2
3
54
6
0
Figure 4: Sample of extracted discriminative subgraph from
Gafgyt malicious family. Here, the graph size is 7, and the la-
bels are arbitrary. Ideally, connecting this subgraph to a sample
should lead the model to misclassify the sample into Gafgyt.
regarding the number of nodes. If the generated CFG failed to be
misclassified by the model, another subgraph is selected in ascending
order with respect to the number of nodes in the set of generated
subgraphs and combined with the same original graph to generate
another CFG. This process is repeated until a subgraph successfully
achieves a misclassification. If no existing subgraph from the set of
targeted subgraphs causes misclassification, the original sample is
returned, hence generating AE is failed.
4 DL-SSMC: DESIGN AND EVALUATION
This section presents DL-SSMC, Deep Learning-based Single Shot
Malware Classification approach. We describe the design and meth-
ods for DL-SSMC in §4.1 and present the evaluation in §4.2.
4.1 DL-SSMC: System Design
For the malware detection design, DL-SSMC aims to distinguish the
malicious IoT applications from the benign. The implementation of
DL-SSMC incorporates deep learning models, e.g., Convolutional
6
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Figure 6: Internal design of the CNN architecture used for de-
tection and classification task. Notice that 46@1x3, for example,
refers to applying 46 filters each of size 1x3 on the input data.
The design consists of four convolutional layers with maxpool-
ing and dropout operations. Then, a dense layer of size 512 is
used with a softmax activation function to output the predic-
tion.
Neural Network (CNN)-based and Deep Neural Network (DNN)-
based models, trained using the extracted CFG-based algorithmic
features. The input (X ) to the model is a one-dimensional (1D) vector
of size 1 × 23 representing the extracted features. We explore the
capabilities of two deep learning architectures, namely CNN and
DNN. We describe the separate designs in the following.
CNN-based Design. The CNN-based DL-SSMC model constitutes
of three blocks, namely convolutional block 1 (ConvB1), convolu-
tional block 2 (ConvB2), and classification block (CB). Figure 6
illustrates the CNN-based DL-SSMC model architecture.
• ConvB1. This block takes in feature vector (X ) as the input.
Architecturally, it is made up of two convolutional layers, a 1D
convolutional layer (Conv 1) with padding and 46 filters (Fb1 ′)
of size 1 × 3, convolving over the input data (X ) with stride of
1, resulting in a 2D tensor (Cb1 ′) of size 1 × 23. Followed by a
similar 1D convolutional layer (Conv 2) without padding. The
output of this layer is a 2D tensor (Cb1 ′′) of size 46 × 21. Then,
a maxpooling operation of size and stride of 2 and dropout with
probability of 0.25 are applied. The output of this block is a 2D
tensor Sb1 of size 46 × 10.
Cb1
′
i = X ⊗ Fb1 ′i
Cb1
′′
i = Cb1
′
i ⊗ Fb1 ′′i
Mb1i = maxpool(Cb1 ′′i , 2, 2)
Sb1i = dropout(Mb1i , 0.25)
• ConvB2. The result of the ConvB1 block (Sb1) is fed into this
block. It is similar to ConvB1, except for the difference in the
number of filters (Fb2 ′) in the convolutional layers. This block
consists of a 1D convolutional layer (Conv 3) with padding and
92 filters of size 1 × 3, convolving with a stride of 1. Followed
by a similar 1D convolutional layer (Conv 4) without padding.
The output of this layer is a 2D tensor Cb2 ′′ of size 92 × 8.
Maxpooling operation of size and stride of 2 is applied, followed
by a dropout with a probability of 0.25, resulting in a 2D tensor
Sb2 of size 92 × 4.
Cb2
′
i = Sb1 ⊗ Fb2 ′i
Cb2
′′
i = Cb2
′
i ⊗ Fb2 ′′i
Mb2i = maxpool(Cb2 ′′i , 2, 2)
Sb2i = dropout(Mb2i , 0.25)
• CB. The generated tensor in ConvB2 (Sb2) is then fed into this
block. The input is forwarded to flatten operation, resulting in a
1D tensor (Fl ) of size 1×368. Followed by a fully connected (FC)
dense layer (FCL) of size 512 and a dropout with a probability
of 0.5 resulting in SFC . Finally, SFC is fed to the softmax layer
as the output layer.
Fl = Flatten(Sb2)
FCL = dense(Fl , 512)
SFC = dropout(FCL, 0.5)
output = softmax(SFC )
DNN-based Design. Figure 7 illustrates the DNN-based DL-SSMC
model. The architecture of the DNN-based model consists of two
consecutive and fully connected dense layers of size 1 × 100 con-
nected to the input vector, followed by a dropout operation with
a probability of 0.25. The output of the dropout function is fed to
fully connected with another two fully connected dense layers of
size 1 × 100, succeeded by a dropout operation with a probability of
0.5. The output is then fed to the softmax layer. This design enables
the extraction of deep feature representations and patterns from the
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Figure 7: The internal architectural of the DNN used for the de-
tection and classification tasks. The design consists of six fully
connected layers, with dropout operations and softmax activa-
tion function.
feature vectors, and therefore, finding discriminative characteristics
for detection and classification processes.
Training Process. We trained the two model architectures, i.e.,
CNN-based and DNN-based DL-SSMC, using 100 epochs with
a batch size of 32. Both the convolutional and the fully connected
layers use Rectified Linear Units (ReLU) as the activation function.
For regularization, we use dropout to prevent model over-fitting and
allow the propagation of robust and distinct features through the
model layers.
Malware Classification Task. Malware classification task refers
to identifying the malware family of targeted samples, while the
detection process aims to detect malicious behavior regardless of the
category to which the malicious behaviors belong. Therefore, the
detection task can be viewed as a binary classification task that aims
to detect malicious behavior from the extracted features of the CFG.
The classification task, on the other hand, aims to detect and identify
the family of the malicious behavior.
Experimental Setup. We evaluate DL-SSMC using the dataset
in §3, and show the robustness against AEs generated using GEA
and SGEA. The experiments were conducted on a workstation op-
erating Ubuntu 16.04 and comprising of an i5-8500 CPU, 32GB
DDR4 RAM, 512GB SSD and 4TB HHD of storage, and NVIDIA
RTX2080 Ti Graphics Processing Unit (GPU). The experiments are
implemented and conducted using Python 3.5.2.
Evaluation Metrics. The performance of the system is reported
using the following evaluation metrics: 1) The accuracy of the model,
computed as the ratio of the correctly labeled samples (CLS) over
all test samples (|D |), defined as: CLS ÷ |D |. 2) False Positive Rate
(FPR), which is the number of incorrectly labeled malware samples
(ILM) over the total number of malicious samples (|Dm |), computed
as ILM ÷ |Dm |. 3) False Negative Rate (FNR), represented as the
incorrectly labeled benign samples (ILB) divided by the total number
of benign samples (|Db |), ILM ÷ |Db |. Finally, the confusion matrix,
where the columns represent the actual classes and the rows are the
predicted labels. The value at a location (x ,y) represent the portion
of the samples of class x classified as y.
4.2 DL-SSMC: Evaluation and Results
4.2.1 DL-SSMC: Baseline Performance. DL-SSMC: De-
tection Task. We designed two-class detection DL-SSMC using the
CNN- and DNN-based models that distinguish IoT malware from
the IoT benign applications. The model is trained over 23 CFG-
based graph-theoretic features categorized into seven groups. The
Table 3: Evaluation of the CNN- and DNN-based IoT malware
detection systems on normal samples (i.e., non-adversarial).
Here, the CNN-based model outperforms its counterpart in
both accuracy and FNR, achieving a detection accuracy of
98.96%.
Architecture Accuracy FNR FPR Time/Epoch
CNN 98.96% 0.88% 1.33% 1.16s
DNN 98.67% 1.41% 1.16% 0.21s
Table 4: Evaluation of the CNN- and DNN-based IoT malware
classification systems on normal samples (i.e., non-adversarial).
Similar to Table 3, the CNN-based model outperforms the DNN-
based model, achieving a classification accuracy of 98.09%.
However, the training time is higher, 1.23 seconds per epoch,
in compare to 0.22 seconds for DNN-based model.
Architecture Accuracy Time/Epoch
CNN 98.09% 1.23s
DNN 97.57% 0.22s
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Figure 8: Confusion matrices of IoT malware classification sys-
tems. Here, each column represents the actual class, whereas,
rows represents the predicted labels.
two models, CNN- and DNN-based, achieve an accuracy rate of
98.96% and 98.67% with a FNR of 0.88% and 1.41% and FPR of
1.33% and 1.16%, respectively. Table 3 shows the evaluation of each
trained model.
DL-SSMC: Classification Task. In addition to detecting the IoT
malicious samples, we also design a four-class classification DL-
SSMC incorporating CNN- and DNN-based model designs. The
classification task aims to evaluate DL-SSMC for classifying the
malicious samples into their corresponding families. We achieved a
CNN- and DNN-based model accuracy rate of 98.09% and 97.57%,
respectively as shown in Table 4. We also provide the the confusion
matrices in Figure 8a and Figure 8b to report the performance of
CNN-based and DNN-based DL-SSMC for the individual class
as each column represents the ground truth class, and every row
represents the predicted labels.
4.2.2 DL-SSMC: Robustness Assessment against GEA.
We investigate the robustness of DL-SSMC against AEs generated
using GEA. GEA is designed to generate practical AEs that fools
the classifier while preserving the functionality and executability
of the original sample. We explore the impact of the size of the
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Figure 9: SGEA: CNN-based IoT malware classification system evaluation. Here, MR refers to misclassification rate, columns repre-
sent the sample original class, whereas, rows represent the connected subgraph pattern class.
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Figure 10: SGEA: DNN-based IoT malware classification system evaluation. Here, MR refers to misclassification rate, columns rep-
resent the sample original class, whereas, rows represent the connected subgraph pattern class.
graph and discuss the fundamental overhead of using GEA. Note
that all generated samples maintain the practicality and functionality
of the original code. From the benign and malicious IoT software,
we selected three graphs as targets (the selected samples have the
minimum, median, and maximum size across the dataset). and con-
nected each of these target graphs with every graph in the testing
dataset of the other class. We used the target graphs to have different
sizes, e.g., minimum, median, and maximum graph size across the
dataset, to understand the impact of size on the misclassification rate
introduced by AEs using GEA.
Robustness of Detection Models. The results of DL-SSMC per-
formance against AEs generated by GEA are shown in Table 5
and Table 6. Intuitively, a key finding is the impact of graph size on
the misclassification rate, since the increase in the graph size, i.e.,
the included number of nodes, results in higher misclassification
rate. However, this success rate of adversarial objectives comes with
a computational cost since the reported time for crafting AEs is
proportional to the size of the injected graph as perturbation. In the
IoT malware detection task, we achieved a malware to benign mis-
classification rate of as high as 100% on both CNN- and DNN-based
models, and a benign to malware misclassification rate of 60.22%
and 60.89% on the respective models.
Robustness of Classification Models. Table 7 shows the targeted
and non-targeted misclassification rates over the IoT malware clas-
sification task. Non-targeted misclassification indicates that after
combining the original and selected samples, the original sample
class changes. On the other hand, if the new assigned label is the
selected sample class, it is considered as targeted misclassification.
Here, we achieved a targeted misclassification rate of 100% from all
malicious families, i.e., when designing AEs with benign-selected
samples so the models misclassify them to benign, using both the
CNN- and DNN-based models. Similar to the IoT malware detection
Table 5: GEA: Malware to benign misclassification rate over
IoT detection systems. MR refers to misclassification rate,
whereas, CT refers to crafting time in millisecond per sample.
Size # Nodes MR (%) CT (ms)CNN DNN
Minimum 10 50.57 61.03 37.39
Median 23 99.64 98.76 40.46
Maximum 1075 100 100 6,430.66
Table 6: GEA: Benign to malware misclassification rate over
IoT detection systems. MR refers to misclassification rate,
whereas, CT refers to crafting time in millisecond per sample.
Size # Nodes MR (%) CT (ms)CNN DNN
Minimum 11 45.92 19.33 34.10
Median 43 60.22 59.90 56.83
Maximum 274 47.36 60.89 763.63
system, the targeted and non-targeted misclassification rates increase
with the increase in the number of nodes for the injected graph.
4.2.3 DL-SSMC: Robustness Assessment against SGEA.
The GEA achieves high misclassification rate by injecting the origi-
nal sample with another selected sample from a target class to fool
the models in predicting the wrong class. The GEA approach comes
with computational cost and increased binary size that accommodate
the combination of two samples into one. These costs are reduced
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Table 7: GEA: Misclassification rate over IoT classification sys-
tems. MR and TMR refers to non-targeted and targeted mis-
classification rates, respectively, whereas, CT refers to the craft-
ing time in millisecond per sample.
Class # Nodes MR (%) TMR (%) CT (ms)CNN DNN CNN DNN
Benign 10 48.72 58.87 45.89 48.54 37.3923 99.64 99.55 99.64 99.38 40.46
1075 100 100 100 100 6,430.66
Gafgyt 13 24.62 41.74 0.17 0.35 32.3664 66.81 77.40 15.97 16.06 68.77
155 54.63 47.13 8.03 0.00 125.15
Mirai 11 41.37 37.22 0.32 0.80 34.1048 62.30 52.15 12.46 0.96 56.84
274 95.60 91.05 93.45 53.67 763.63
Tsunami 15 59.54 60.73 0.12 0.12 35.2559 63.95 64.06 0.00 0.00 59.93
138 66.74 64.36 0.00 0.00 201.82
Table 8: SGEA: Benign to malware IoT malware detection sys-
tem evaluation. Here, MR refers to misclassification rate, AVG.
Size refers to the overall average subgraph size used to achieve
misclassification, and CT is sample’s crafting time in seconds.
Architecture MR(%) AVG. Size CT (s)
CNN 22.22 10.15 2.57
DNN 33.88 11.09 2.23
Table 9: SGEA: Malware to benign IoT malware detection sys-
tem evaluation. Here, MR refers to misclassification rate, AVG.
Size refers to the overall average subgraph size used to achieve
misclassification, and CT is sample’s crafting time in seconds.
Architecture MR(%) AVG. Size CT (s)
CNN 100 6.80 0.23
DNN 100 6.86 0.21
by using the SGEA approach that reduces the size of injection to
carefully selected subgraph that achieves the adversarial objective.
Robustness of Detection Models. Table 8 and Table 9 show the re-
sults of SGEA against CNN- and DNN-based DL-SSMC detection
models. Notice that GEA outperforms SGEA in benign to malware
misclassification. However, SGEA achieves 100% malware to be-
nign misclassification rate against CNN- and DNN-based models,
outperforming the GEA approach with an average subgraph size of
6.80 and 6.86, respectively.
Robustness of Classification Models. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show
the results of the CNN- and DNN-based DL-SSMC classification
models against the SGEA approach. Figure 9a and Figure 9c rep-
resent the non-targeted and targeted misclassification rate using
the CNN-based model, respectively. Similarly, Figure 10a, and Fig-
ure 10c show the non-targeted and targeted misclassification rate
using the DNN-based model, respectively. While the columns rep-
resent the sample’s original class, the rows represent the class that
subgraph pattern was extracted from. Targeted misclassification oc-
curs when the AE’s predicted label is not different than the class that
the subgraph pattern belongs to. Figure 9b, Figure 9d, Figure 10b
and Figure 10d represent the average size of the connected subgraphs
to generate the AEs over the CNN- and DNN-based models. For
instance, SGEA approach successfully misclassifies all Gafgyt test
samples into benign using the CNN-based classification model with
an average subgraph size of 20.23 nodes. Moreover, it misclassifies
all Gafgyt test samples into other classes using discriminative sub-
graphs from benign samples with an average size of 6.77 nodes. Note
that all classes have a high targeted misclassification rate toward
benign class and low targeted misclassification rate from benign to
malicious families and among the malicious families. This is a result
of the nature of the benign samples; they are diverse in character-
istics and functionalities. However, malicious samples within the
same family are more likely to share similar behaviors, resulting in
distinctive traits that can be captured from the extracted CFG.
AE Crafting Time (GEA vs. SGEA). The SGEA significantly re-
duces the size of AEs and introduces more sophisticated adversarial
settings by incorporating reduced perturbation to the software sam-
ple. However, similar to GEA, the SGEA approach is computation-
ally extensive. We observe an average AE crafting time of 4.74 and
3.95 seconds per sample using CNN- and DNN-based classification
models, in comparison to the average crafting time of 0.65 seconds
for the GEA approach.
5 DL-FHMC: COPING WITH AES
In this section, we propose and describe the DL-FHMC approach,
Fine-grained Hierarchical Learning for Malware Classification. Ma-
chine learning methods for malware detection and classification,
e.g., DL-SSMC, are susceptible to AEs and fall short of delivering
a robust system against adversarial settings, as shown in §4. This
motivates to explore methods and alternative designs to cope with
such vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. We propose DL-FHMC, a
robust system for malware detection and classification that leverages
deep learning on a fine-grained and hierarchical manner to detect
suspicious malicious behaviors.
5.1 DL-FHMC: System Design
The design of DL-FHMC consists of five components as illustrated
in Figure 11. Description of each component is in the following.
• CFG Extraction. This component is responsible for extracting
the CFGs of the software samples using Radare2, and presenting
them as labeled CFGs for further analysis.
• Feature Extraction. The feature extraction component calcu-
lates 23 algorithmic features from the samples’ CFGs. Details of
the extracted features are in §3.1 and Table 2.
• Malware Detection. The malware detection component utilizes
a CNN-based model that has the model architecture of Figure 6.
The purpose of this model is to classify the samples into mal-
ware and benign. Samples classified as benign are directed to
a suspicious behavior detection process. Samples classified as
malware are directed to a classification model.
• Malware Classification. This component is fed by the samples
classified as malware by the malware detection component. The
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Figure 11: Fine-grained hierarchical learning classification flow. First, corresponding CFGs of the IoT software are generated, then,
23 algorithmic features are extracted from the CFGs. Afterward, an IoT malware detection system classifies samples into benign and
malware, all malware samples are directed to IoT malware classification system, while benign samples are directed into suspicious
behavior detection system for further investigation. SBD refers to suspicious behavior detection system.
goal of this component is to classify the sample into three IoT
malicious families, i.e., Gafgyt, Mirai, and Tsunami. The design
and architecture of this component is similar to the CNN-based
classification model of Figure 6.
• Suspicious Behavior Detector. This component detects a poten-
tial suspicious behavior within the samples. Since the adversary
may generate AEs with the purpose of fooling the system in as-
signing them to benign class, this component further investigates
the potential of suspicious behavior within the benign-classified
sample using the extracted CFG.
Suspicious Behavior Detector. Suspicious Behavior Detector is a
graph mining-based technique to investigate suspicious malicious
patterns within software samples classified as benign. Figure 12
highlights the design of the Suspicious Behavior Detector, which
consists of four modules, 1 subgraphs mining, 2 pattern selection,
3 data representation, and 4 suspicious behavior detection model.
In the following, we describe each module.
1 Subgraphs Mining: This module extracts common subgraphs
within each IoT malware family. Using gSpan, we extracted and col-
lected frequent subgraphs of a size range between 5 to 20 nodes from
each malicious family. In particular, we used the gSpan algorithm
to extract subgraphs from the training samples of each malicious
family. This process took more than 160 hours to finish and resulted
in over 2,150,170 patterns distributed as 22,953 for Gafgyt, 127,217
for Mirai, and over 2,000,000 for Tsunami families. The extracted
frequent subgraphs (patterns) for each malicious family are then
subjected to further analysis.
2 Pattern Selection: This module ranks the extracted patterns
based on four factors: pattern size, frequency, coverage, and inverse
frequency. For examples, large patterns are assigned higher value
since they are distinctive and more likely to be unique to their fam-
ily. Moreover, large patterns can be further decomposed to smaller
patterns. Further, the number of occurrences of a pattern within a
malicious family is considered as an indication of its malicious-
ness. On the other hand, less frequent patterns are more likely to
be function-oriented and solely contribute to the functionality of
the code rather than the general behavior of the malware family.
Therefore, we excluded all patterns that occurred in less than 5% of
the targeted family samples. The coverage of the pattern is defined
as
∑n
i=1 1/occurrencei − 1, where n is a set of samples in which
the pattern occurred, and occurrencei is the number of patterns con-
tained within the sample i. For example, if a sample contains only
one pattern, that pattern will have the highest rank. In addition, we
compute the number of occurrences for each pattern in the benign
training samples. Note that benign samples may have patterns simi-
lar to the ones in the malware due to the abstract nature of the CFG
and the considered size and functionality of patterns. To ensure that
all patterns hold some behavioral characteristics of the malicious
family, we excluded all malicious patterns that appeared in more
than ten benign samples. We filtered the patterns and selected the
top 10,000 ranked patterns from each family to be its representative
patterns. This results in a total of 30,000 malware patterns for the
three malware families. We denote this set of patterns as P .
3 Data Representation: To investigate an IoT software, we find
whether each of the selected 30,000 patterns is a subgraph of the
CFG of the software using the VF2 subgraph isomorphism algorithm
[19]. Each sample is represented as a binary vector in the space of
the patterns extracted in the previous module, i.e., v ∈ {0, 1} |P | .
Specifically, we represent each sample by a hot-encoding vector v
of size 30,000, where vi = 1 if the ith pattern is a subgraph of the
sample’s CFG, i.e., vi = 1 if pi ⊆ G , pi ∈ P . Time-wise, represent-
ing a software’s CFG as a hot-encoding vector may require several
minutes and up to several hours, depending on its size (number of
nodes) and structure.
4 Suspicious Behavior Detection Model: Suspicious Behavior
Detector model is a CNN-based model trained on the feature repre-
sentations extracted from the training dataset shown in Table 1. The
goal of this module is to investigate suspicious behavior within the
sample. If the sample is classified as suspicious, further analysis is
required by an analyst or dynamic analysis approach.
Experimental Setup. We trained the Suspicious Behavior Detector
model on the feature representation of the training dataset, where all
malicious samples are labeled as suspicious. We did not incorporate
AEs in the training process, and thus the process may be biased
in evaluating the system against samples generated using the same
approach (e.g., SGEA). Further, we generated AEs using both GEA
and SGEA, to force the detection model to misclassify the IoT
malware samples as benign, thereby, directing the samples to the
Suspicious Behavior Detector component. The generation of the
AEs are similar to the process discussed in §4. However, we focus
on the malware to benign misclassification only, as such behavior
have critical consequences on the system behavior.
5.2 DL-FHMC: Evaluation and Results
DL-FHMC: Detection Task. The DL-FHMC system aims to estab-
lish a robust malware classification approach through hierarchical
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Figure 12: Suspicious behavior detection system design. The design consists of four modules, subgraphs mining module to extract fre-
quent subgraphs from three IoT malicious families. Afterward, the subgraphs are ranked by the pattern selection module, where the
top 10,000 patterns of each malicious family are selected. Further, 1,000 subgraphs are extracted from the CFG of each sample redi-
rected to the Suspicious Behavior Detector, and represented as a vector of size 30, 000. The vector representation is fed to Suspicious
Behavior Detector model to be classified into benign and suspicious.
Table 10: DL-FHMC classifier evaluation on GEA and SGEA
AEs classified as malware by the detection model. All SGEA,
Tsunami, and large GEA AEs were misclassified to benign, rep-
resented as “–”. Here, all Mirai samples that failed to misclas-
sify the detector where correctly classified.
Type Gafgyt Mirai Tsunami
GEA
Small 65.90% 100% –
Median 50.00% 100% –
Large – – –
SGEA – – –
levels of abstractions. The first task of the system is the malware
detection, where samples are classified into malicious and benign.
This task is conducted using the same model architecture described
in §4.1 and illustrated in Figure 6. The baseline performance of
the detection model is shown in Table 3 achieving an accuracy of
98.96%. We also demonstrated the robustness assessment of the
model against AEs generated by GEA and SGEA in Table 5 and Ta-
ble 9, respectively. We assume using the same detection model, and
evaluate the overall system (DL-FHMC), by including the perfor-
mance of the the following components of the system, which are the
Suspicious Behavior Detector and the malware classification model.
DL-FHMC: Classification Task. Malware samples that are de-
tected by the malware detection model, i.e., their malicious behavior
is successfully detected, are then directed to a classification model to
predict the family of the malware, i.e., Gafgyt, Mirai, and Tsunami.
This model is similar to the classification model in §4.1, however,
in this component only malicious samples are classified (no benign
class). To build and evaluate the model for this task, we trained a
CNN-based model on malware samples of the three malware fam-
ilies from the training set of our dataset. The model achieves an
overall accuracy of 97.34% on malware samples. To evaluate the
model’s robustness, we examine the model performance against
AEs that fail to fool the detection model, i.e., malware AEs that are
still detected as malware. Table 10 shows the performance of the
classification model on the AEs. Since the malicious AEs generated
by SGEA and large GEA are passed with no detection, i.e., their
misclassification rate is 100% on the detection task, they were not
directed to the classification model and therefore are not included
Table 11: DL-FHMC Suspicious Behavior Detector evaluation
on benign and adversarial samples. DO refers to Data origin,
and AR is the accuracy rate. Here, 93.00% of the benign sam-
ples are correctly classified. Additionally, 100% of the large
GEA AEs are detected as suspicious, with an overall perfor-
mance of 90.79%.
DO Benign GEA SGEA OverallSmall Median Large
AR 93.00% 62.79% 98.78% 100% 79.63% 90.79%
in the results. For the same reason, all samples from the Tsunami
family are not included. However, successfully-detected malicious
AEs, i.e., belonging to GEA-based samples (small and median), are
classified with an accuracy of 100% for Mirai AEs and 65.90% and
50.00% of the Gafgyt AEs generated by small and median GEA
approach, respectively.
DL-FHMC: Suspicious Behavior Detection Task. This compo-
nent aims to further investigate the benign-classified samples based
on patterns extracted from their structural components. The task of
Suspicious Behavior Detector, i.e., CNN-based classifier built on
features that represent the existence of malicious patterns within the
input sample, is to determine whether a given sample is signaling
a suspicion of malicious behavior, and therefore it is operating as
an AEs detection technique. We evaluate the Suspicious Behavior
Detector using the original benign samples and malicious AEs. As
shown in Table 11 the detector achieves an accuracy of 93.00% for
classifying benign samples and an accuracy of 62.79%, 98.78%,
and 100% for classifying GEA-based AEs with small, median, and
large perturbation, respectively. The detector achieves a detection
accuracy of 79.63% for AEs generated using SGEA approach. In-
troducing large perturbations in the samples increases the changes
of introducing some subgraph patterns that are signatures of the
malicious samples. This explains the high accuracy achieved by
the detector for large perturbations. This results show that using
DL-FHMC enabled a systematic methods of coping with adversarial
manipulation to malware. When a suspicious behavior is detected
for a given sample, other methods can be adopted to analyze the
sample in order to provide robust evaluation of malicious activities.
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6 DISCUSSION
DL-FHMC: Cost of Security. The security of machine learning al-
gorithms is important for many applications since it has been shown
that such algorithms are vulnerable to adversarial attacks (i.e., AEs).
In malware classification field, AEs pose critical security implica-
tions as emerging studies have shown that AEs can fool the machine
learning-based malware detection system [4, 5, 45]. However, lim-
ited studies have investigated potential defenses. In this work, we
show that launching adversarial attacks against malware detection
system can lead to a misclassification rate of as high as 100%. To
cope with such adversarial settings and capabilities, we introduced
DL-FHMC that operates on multiple level of behavioral analysis
of the software to insure its security. Since AEs are derived from
a combination of benign and malware components, detecting them
is a challenging task and often comes at the cost of misclassifying
a portion of benign samples as malicious, hence producing false
alarms. For example, in our experiments, we show that successfully-
detecting 88.52% of AEs is accompanied by 7.00% false alarms
resulting from detecting suspicious behavior in the benign samples.
DL-FHMC Robustness. The suspicious behavior detector in DL-
FHMC consists of a CNN-based model trained on the vector rep-
resentations of the extracted patterns. In the context of adversarial
attacks, it should be robust against perturbation to the original sam-
ples. Otherwise, it will suffer from the effects of adversarial exam-
ples. We took this into account in the design process. Ideally, the
detector represents the benign samples into a vector representation
of zeros. In our dataset, ≈ 85% of the benign samples are represented
as a vector of all zeros, indicating that none of the malicious pat-
terns captured within them. Therefore, to generate successful AEs
against DL-FHMC, adversaries have to conceal malicious patterns
by modifying the functionality of the malicious sample, therefore,
contrasting the practicality and functionality requirements of the
generated AE.
Potential Investigation Technique: Dynamic Analysis. For accu-
rate and fail-proof malware detection, every sample should be an-
alyzed dynamically and filtered based on its behavior. However,
dynamic analysis has its own downsides: 1 It requires setting up
of a sandboxed environment such that the execution of the mal-
ware does not impact the underlining host system. 2 It is costly
in terms of time and memory. These make the dynamic analysis
techniques difficult to scale. Our proposed technique puts forward
a static analysis based fine-grained hierarchical approach towards
malware detection. The samples classified as benign in the first phase
are sent to the Suspicious Behavior Detector for investigation using
the deeper CFG based features (subgraphs). The samples that are
detected as suspicious in the second phase are finally considered as
potential for dynamic analysis. Statistically, only 2.42% (42 out of
1,733) of the normal samples, i.e., non-adversarial, were identified
as the ones to be directed for dynamic analysis, thereby reducing
the load on the dynamic analysis technique, hence overcoming its
potential difficulties.
Binary Obfuscation. Malware authors often use different packing
techniques, e.g., Ultimate Packer for Executables (UPX), to obfus-
cate different parts of the malware code base, such as functions
and strings. In obfuscated functions, the CFG would differ from the
actual unpacked malware. Thereby, the detector should be aware of
obfuscation and can accurately classify the obfuscated software and
examining the behavior of packed and unpacked software.
7 RELATED WORK
Malware Analysis. While a lot of effort has been put towards mal-
ware analysis and detection in general, IoT malware analysis still
lacks the effort. Among the IoT malware studies, efforts towards the
analysis and detection of malicious software are limited, particularly,
from the lens of CFG. ManXu et al. [53] proposed a CNN-based
malware detection system for the Android application from the se-
mantic representation of the graph (i.e., control and data flow graphs
representations). In addition, Yang et al. [55] identified and detected
Android malicious behaviors throughout generating two-level behav-
ioral representations built from the CFG graph and call graphs of
the program. Allix et al. [11] designed multiple machine learning
classifiers to detect Android malware using different textual represen-
tations extracted from the applications’ CFGs. Further, Alasmary et
al. [9] conducted an in-depth CFG-based comparative study for the
Android and IoT malware. Similarly, Pa et al. [39] established the
first IoT honeypot and sandbox system, called IoTPOT, that run
over eight CPU architectures to capture the IoT attacks running over
Telnet protocol. Similarly, Caselden et al. [17] built an algorithm
that generates an attack from the representation of the hybrid infor-
mation and CFG applied to the program binaries. Alam et al. [7]
proposed a metamorphic malware analysis and detection system that
uses two different techniques that match the CFGs of small malware
and then address the change in the opcodes frequencies. Moreover,
Tamersoy et al. [46] proposed a malware detection algorithm that
identifies the executable files of the malware and then computes
the similarities between them to partial dataset files from the Nor-
ton Community Watch. Then, they construct graphs based on the
measurement of inter-relationship between these files. In addition,
Wuchner et al. [51] proposed a graph-based detection system that
uses a quantitative data flow graphs generated from the system calls,
and use the graph node properties, i.e., centrality metric, as a feature
vector for the classification between malicious and benign programs.
Moreover, they extended the work by using a compression-based
mining technique applied to the quantitative data flow graphs for
malware detection [50]. Moreover, Cen et al. [18] used Android
API calls as features extracted from the decompiled source code of
the software, and proposed a probabilistic logistic regression-based
model for malware detection.
Adversarial Machine Learning. Machine/deep learning networks
are widely used in security-related tasks, including malware detec-
tion [10, 13, 36, 37]. However, it has been shown that deep learning-
based models are vulnerable against adversarial attacks [35]. Given
that, it should be noted that such a behavior can be a critical issue
in malware detection systems, where misclassifying malware as
benign may result in disastrous consequences [4, 6]. Various ad-
versarial machine learning attack methods in the context of image
classification have been introduced to generate AEs. For example,
Goodfellow et al. [30] introduced FGSM, a family of fast method
attacks to generate AEs that forces the model to misclassification. In
addition, Carlini et al. [16] proposed three L-norm-based adversarial
attacks, known as C&W adversarial attacks, to investigate the robust-
ness of neural networks and existing adversarial defenses. Similarly,
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Moosavi et al. [38] proposed DeepFool, an L2 distance-based adver-
sarial iterative method to generate AEs with minimal perturbation.
Further, a critical application of the AEs is malware detection. Re-
cent studies investigated generating AEs in the context of malware
detection [45]. For instance, Grosse et al. [29] implemented an aug-
mented adversarial crafting algorithm to generate AEs, misleading
a CNN-based classifier to misclassify 63% of the malware samples
to benign. The detection of the AEs is challenging [15]. While, to
the best of our knowledge, no one has investigated the detection of
AEs in the context of malware detection, multiple studies attempt
to detect them in the context of image classification [33, 34, 52],
achieving detection accuracy of 20% to 80%. In this study, we imple-
mented DL-FHMC, a graph mining-based fine-grained hierarchical
learning approach for suspicious behavior detection, achieving an
accuracy of 88.52% in detecting CFG-based AEs.
8 CONCLUSION
This work investigates the robustness of graph-based deep learning
models against adversarial machine learning attacks. To set out,
first, an in-depth analysis of malware binaries is conducted through
constructing abstract structures using CFG, which are analyzed
from multiple aspects, such as the number of nodes and edges,
as well as graph algorithmic constructs, such as average shortest
path, betweenness, closeness, density, etc. Then, two IoT malware
classification approaches are introduced, DL-SSMC and DL-FHMC.
Then, we generate AEs using two state-of-the-art adversarial attacks,
GEA and SGEA approaches. We observed that both GEA and SGEA
are capable to misclassify 100% of malware samples as benign in
DL-SSMC. However, DL-FHMC was able to detect 88.52% of the
AEs, improving the overall robustness in compare to DL-SSMC.
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